THE LIBERATION WAR

How the Second Trump Administration Sought to Liberate the State from Its Citizens

A Comprehensive Strategic Analysis · Second Revised Edition
Including falsifiability criteria, comparative dimension, resistance analysis, and global risk scenarios

WORKING DOCUMENT · FOR RESEARCH AND DELIBERATIVE PURPOSES

PART ONE

WAR ON RESIDENTS

A Doctrine of Domestic Belligerence in the Second Trump Administration

Comprehensive strategic analysis · Second revised edition

EPISTEMIC LABELING SYSTEM	
[VERIFIED]	Documented fact with primary source.
[ONGOING]	Initiated; outcome pending.
[PROJECTED]	Institutional forecast (CBO, Fed, etc.).
[SCENARIO]	Analytical extrapolation.

> *The language of war has historically been reserved for conflicts between sovereign states. Yet the doctrine promulgated since January 2025 — which targets civilians through economic siege, dismantles their medical defenses, controls their bodies and their votes, and floods their information landscape with disinformation — satisfies, in terms of civil governance, every criterion of a sustained campaign of belligerence against a domestic population.*

This analysis adopts a deliberately confrontational analytical framework: that of a government conducting a low-intensity war against the residents it ostensibly governs. This is not rhetorical hyperbole. It is a diagnostic instrument. When the standard tools of policy analysis — cost-benefit, constituency logic, legislative intent — fail to explain why an administration would simultaneously attack healthcare, labor safety, democratic participation, due process, and the epistemological common good, the war framework becomes the most parsimonious explanation available.

0. Falsifiability Criteria for the Analytical Framework

This analysis adopts the belligerence framework as a diagnostic instrument, not as an axiomatic conclusion. To be intellectually honest, it must specify the conditions under which the framework would be incorrect. The following set of criteria, if sustained, would invalidate the central thesis:

- Judicial injunctions are systematically complied with by the executive without strategic evasion or delay;
- Vacancies generated by the 'Fork in the Road' program are filled with staff of equivalent experience within 18 months;

- Voter deregistration mechanisms are withdrawn after consolidated adverse judicial rulings, without resort to alternative emergency powers;
- Tariff revenues are redistributed as compensatory transfers to populations affected by tariff inflation, proportionally and verifiably;
- Illegal detentions are treated as systemic failures subject to institutional reform, with documented individual accountability and redress to those affected.

This analysis has no evidence of any of these five criteria at the time of writing. Their absence is not conclusive proof of intentional belligerence, but it is consistent with it. The framework remains the most parsimonious hypothesis given the available facts.

I. The Siege Economy: Tariffs as Collective Punishment

[VERIFIED] The Federal Reserve documented that 94% of tariff costs fell on American businesses and consumers, not on foreign producers. The inflationary effect was estimated at an additional 0.7 percentage points, with furniture up 4% and tableware up 5%.

In classic siege warfare, the attacker surrounds a population and systematically destroys its capacity for subsistence: cutting supply lines, inflating the cost of necessities, and waiting for attrition to break resistance. The tariff architecture of the second Trump administration replicates this mechanism with bureaucratic precision.

[PROJECTED] The NBER corroborates the Fed's findings. CBO models project that the cumulative inflationary impact by 2027 could exceed 1.2 percentage points if tariffs are maintained at current levels.

> *The siege logic operates through cumulative deprivation rather than single decisive blows. No family goes bankrupt from a 5% increase in the price of tableware. But that increase, combined with doubled health insurance premiums, Medicaid deregistration, and stagnant wages, becomes a screw that tightens year after year.*

The NBER corroborates the Fed's findings, yet administration officials continued asserting the opposite. This is a significant feature of the siege economy, not an error: successful siege warfare requires keeping the besieged population uncertain about the source of their suffering, preventing them from correctly attributing cause to effect and mobilizing accordingly.

II. Causal Attribution: Healthcare and Medical Attrition

The following analysis explicitly acknowledges the methodological limitation of single causal attribution. Rural hospital closures have multiple causes: secular rural depopulation, pre-existing reimbursement trends, and pandemic-accumulated financial damage. The argument is not that policy is the only cause, but that it is a documented accelerator.

Attribution Context — Hospital Closures

[ONGOING] Rural hospital closures in Texas and Maine are documented for 2025. The rural hospital closure rate between 2015–2024 averaged approximately 12–15 per year according to American Hospital Association data. The post-BBBA rate requires tracking in the 2025–2026 reporting cycles to establish statistically significant acceleration.

Medicaid work requirements serve as the primary example of a mechanism designed for administrative deregistration rather than genuine eligibility verification. Arkansas demonstrated this effect empirically: when it implemented work requirements, tens of thousands were deregistered without any documented increase in employment. The state that served as the test case thus becomes the source of refutation for the efficiency arguments.

[VERIFIED] The CBO estimated that between 10 and 15 million people will lose coverage as a result of the BBBA. More than 90% of working-age Medicaid beneficiaries were already employed, in school, caring for dependents, or disabled before work requirements (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2024).

[PROJECTED] Acceleration of Medicare trust fund insolvency threatens automatic $500 billion in cuts between 2026 and 2034. ACA premiums are projected to double for many enrollees, with 4 million or more additional Americans uninsured by 2034.

III. Workforce Decapitation: The Institutional Knowledge Campaign

[VERIFIED] The 'Fork in the Road' program resulted in approximately 123,000 departures by September 2025. 25,747 instances were documented requiring the rehiring of workers who had been dismissed, including nuclear safety engineers, avian flu responders, and veteran benefits processors.

Among the most reliable tactics in the war manual is the targeted elimination of the adversary's institutional command capacity. It is not necessary to destroy an army's equipment if one can disorient its officers, dissolve its chain of command, and send its specialists into exile. The administration's approach to the federal workforce follows this doctrine with uncomfortable precision.

> *The 'voluntary' characterization of the program conceals what was, in practice, an environment of institutional intimidation. Harvard's Sharon Block observed: 'the environment the Trump administration created for*

> *federal employees was so unsustainable that I think it's very difficult to call them voluntary.'*

Decades of experience in regulatory enforcement, public health institutional memory, and national security knowledge have been expelled from government service. Unlike equipment, these capabilities cannot be reconstituted from an acquisition catalog. They require years of cultivation and cannot be rebuilt through emergency rehiring of the same people who were expelled.

IV. Demographic Targeting: The Immigration Campaign

In modern conflict doctrine, the targeting of civilian populations by demographic category constitutes a war crime under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The administration's immigration enforcement apparatus does not reach that domestic legal threshold, but its operational logic — the systematic targeting, detention, and expulsion of a defined demographic group — corresponds to population-clearing doctrine in ways that demand explicit naming.

[VERIFIED] Courts have declared more than 4,400 detentions illegal. At least 170 confirmed US citizens were detained as of October 2025. Thousands of individuals have disappeared from ICE records. These statistics, however, require contextualization: they represent approximately [X%] of the total detention volume in the period — a figure the administration has not made public and that will prevent a definitive assessment until records are accessible.

The chilling effect extends far beyond directly targeted immigrant communities. Permanent legal residents, naturalized citizens, and American-born children of immigrants have reduced their public activity, avoided civic spaces, and withdrawn from healthcare and educational institutions out of fear of encounter with enforcement agents. This is the functional equivalent of a curfew.

V. Occupation of Civic Space: The Democratic Participation Campaign

[VERIFIED] The March 2025 executive order requiring proof of citizenship for voter registration was suspended by multiple federal courts. Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ruled that such unilateral instructions are 'contrary to the manifest will of Congress,' with more than thirty states filing legal challenges.

[ONGOING] The SAVE Act and related legislation would criminalize electoral officials, require passports or photo ID for voter registration, and effectively disenfranchise tens of millions of Americans who lack the specified documentation.

> *Electoral accountability is the last civilian check on executive power. When that check is disabled — through disenfranchisement, institutional intimidation, or manipulation of electoral administration — the population loses its last non-violent instrument of recourse. That is the point.*

VI. Comparative Dimension: Democratic Backsliding in International Context

Rigorous analysis requires situating the phenomena described here in the context of global democratic backsliding. The patterns observed in the second Trump administration have documented analogs in Hungary, Turkey, Brazil and India. The comparison does not imply moral or institutional equivalence, but allows us to identify which mechanisms are common to the phenomenon and which are specific to the American context, as well as to learn from the recovery or consolidation trajectories in those cases.

Mechanism	Hungary (Orbán, 2010–)	Turkey (Erdoğan, 2016–)	USA (Trump II, 2025–)	Key Difference (USA)
Judicial capture	Constitutional Court expanded; mandatory retirement age to purge justices. Completed in 18 months.	Post-failed coup: 4,000 judges purged; judicial council reorganized under executive control.	Accelerated nominations; solid Supreme Court majority; attempts to curtail lower court jurisdiction.	Federalism: state and district judges remain as counterweights. Full purge is harder without control of states.
Media capture	Public media converted to mouthpieces; 80%+ of media ecosystem under allied oligarchs' control by 2018.	150+ outlets closed post-coup; 90%+ of media under pro-government control by 2020.	Attacks on hostile media; use of federal regulation as leverage; alternative media ecosystem already consolidated.	First Amendment prevents direct censorship. Strategy is indirect coercion and delegitimization, not prohibition.
Civil society restriction	'Stop Soros' law (2018): criminalizes legal aid to migrants; NGOs must register as 'foreign agents' if they receive external funding.	University closures (Gülen network); severe restrictions on civil society; journalists imprisoned.	Reduced federal funding to NGOs; regulatory pressure on universities; tax-exempt status revoked from critical organizations.	American civil society is significantly larger and more diverse; private philanthropy can partially offset federal funding loss.
Electoral reform	Extreme gerrymandering; new campaign rules favor Fidesz; state media saturates electoral space.	Electoral laws changed three times to favor AKP; international observers document irregularities.	Executive order requiring citizenship proof for voter registration; restrictions on mail-in voting; SAVE Act in legislative	Constitution distributes electoral control to states; resistance in 30+ states is significant. But federal legislative process can alter this.

Mechanism	Hungary (Orbán, 2010–)	Turkey (Erdoğan, 2016–)	USA (Trump II, 2025–)	Key Difference (USA)
			pipeline.	
Discursive justification	'Illiberal democracy': executive represents authentic popular will against cosmopolitan liberal elites.	'Majority democracy': coup plotters and traitors are legitimately excluded from the political demos.	'Constitutional patriotism': the true constitution is restored against the 'deep state' and electoral fraud.	US lacks the ethnic and religious homogeneity Orbán/Erdoğan exploit. 'Internal betrayal' narrative is analogous but the social fabric is more heterogeneous.

The most significant difference between the American case and the international analogs is federalism as structural resistance. Orbán and Erdoğan operated in parliamentary systems where majority control of the legislative branch conferred control over virtually all state powers. American federalism distributes electoral, judicial and administrative power in ways that make consolidation slower and harder. However, as Hungary and Turkey demonstrate, initial resistance does not guarantee the outcome: both democracies appeared robust in the early years of their respective regimes.

[SCENARIO] The Hungarian trajectory suggests that the threshold of irreversibility was reached approximately 4 years after the start of institutional reforms, when media capture was sufficiently complete that the opposition could no longer compete on equivalent informational terms. In the American case, that threshold could be reached around the 2028 electoral cycle if current trends continue without effective judicial or legislative correction.

VII. Volatile Overseas Escalation: The Resource Drain

[VERIFIED] Following the June 2025 conflict, a massive military concentration in December 2025 — described by analysts as the largest concentration of American military assets since the 2003 Iraq invasion — preceded a second outbreak of hostilities despite simultaneous negotiations.

This is not an isolated event. It is a repetitive pattern: diplomatic engagement followed by military action, generating strategic uncertainty in all theaters where American commitments are at stake. The domestic resource implications are direct: military escalation at this scale consumes fiscal resources that are simultaneously facing reduction through Medicare and Medicaid cuts.

VIII. Epistemic War: The Campaign Against Shared Reality

[VERIFIED] The Senate Finance Committee used the term 'gaslighting' to describe the administration's characterization of the impacts of healthcare cuts. This language, unusual in formal legislative contexts, reflects something genuinely distinctive about the current information environment.

Every major military campaign in the modern era has included a psychological operations component — the systematic distortion of the adversary's understanding of events to paralyze their capacity for coherent response. The administration's information environment constitutes the domestic civilian equivalent.

When institutional analysis systematically contradicts administrative claims, the result is not merely political disagreement. It is epistemic crisis: an inability to agree on basic operational realities. Opposition, judicial oversight and electoral accountability all depend on a citizenry capable of evaluating policy outcomes against stated intentions. That capacity is the ultimate target of sustained institutional disinformation.

IX. The Efficiency Arguments: Honest Examination of the Opposing Position

Analytical rigor requires serious examination of the arguments that defenders of the policies analyzed here would present. This analysis does not dispute the existence of the pathologies those arguments identify, but the method of addressing them — specifically, the composite, simultaneous and non-compensatory nature of the interventions.

The Redundant Bureaucracy Argument

OPM data shows that federal employment grew 14% between 2010 and 2024. Proponents of staff reduction argue that accumulated bureaucracy generates layers of regulatory review (NEPA, ITAR) that slow infrastructure and defense projects for years. The public economics literature on 'rent bureaucracy' is real and offers grounds for reforming the size of the state.

Where the argument fails: Reduction through indiscriminate mass dismissal is not bureaucratic reform. The 25,747 emergency rehiring cases demonstrate that the process was not preceded by redundancy analysis. Nuclear safety engineers and avian flu responders are not rent bureaucracy.

The Medicaid Dependency Trap Argument

The labor economics literature documents disincentive effects in some conditional transfer programs. Authors such as Moffitt (2002) and Chetty (2015) have demonstrated that program design can create disengagement thresholds that penalize the transition to employment. Work requirements, in theory, address this real pathology.

Where the argument fails: Empirical evidence from Arkansas demonstrates that Medicaid work requirements in their current form do not increase employment — they only reduce coverage. More than 90% of beneficiaries were already working or in situations that exempt them. The instrument is not calibrated to the problem it claims to solve.

The Trade Deficit Vulnerability Argument

Baldwin ('The Great Convergence,' 2016) and other economists document that the hyperglobalization of the 1990s–2010s created supply chain dependencies that constitute real national security vulnerabilities. Dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors, Chinese rare earths and Indian generic drugs is a legitimate risk that the tariff framework claims to address.

Where the argument fails: Non-discriminatory tariffs without complementary industrial policy do not build domestic capacity — they only transfer rents. Building supply chain resilience requires specific investment (CHIPS Act, IRA) that is simultaneously being defunded. The instrument and the objective are misaligned.

X. The Composite Disruption Doctrine

The defining characteristic of this campaign — the element that elevates it from a collection of aggressive policies to something that justifies the war framework — is its orchestration. Unlike traditional governance, which addresses challenges sequentially and within institutional frameworks, this administration's approach creates vulnerabilities that compound: policies in one domain amplify damage in others.

Tariff inflation exacerbates healthcare inaccessibility. Cuts to the federal workforce reduce the regulatory capacity needed to identify and address economic harms. Immigration law enforcement paralyzes civic participation among populations that might otherwise organize political opposition. Voting restrictions limit electoral recourse for those most disadvantaged by all of the above. Disinformation obscures the connections between these mechanisms.

> *This architecture is not designed to address discrete problems. It is designed to transform the relationship between citizens and their government, replacing predictable institutional processes with discretionary, often chaotic executive action. The objective is the permanent subordination of institutional capacity to executive will.*

XI. Resistance Capacity: Assessment of Available Mechanisms

The historical analysis of domestic belligerence campaigns — from the McCarthy-era purges to COINTELPRO, through the post-9/11 surveillance state — consistently shows that resistance mechanisms were available and that the question was always whether the institutions and individuals responsible for using them did so in time. The following table assesses the current state of those mechanisms.

Mechanism	Status 2025	Primary Limitation	Historical Analog
Judicial injunction	>4,400 detentions declared illegal; voter registration executive order blocked in 30+ states.	Enforcement requires executive compliance. Precedent: Ex parte Merryman (1861) — Lincoln ignored habeas corpus order without immediate consequences.	Ex parte Merryman (1861); Little Rock (1957)
Congressional oversight	Divided/paralyzed — Republican majority blocks investigations; Senate has ceded confirmation and spending prerogatives.	Party discipline and filibuster neutralize oversight function. No precedent of sustained bipartisan action in this cycle.	Post-Watergate reforms (1974–78); Church Committee (1975–76)
State nullification	Emerging — 30+ states challenge federal orders; some developing autonomous electoral administration frameworks.	Fiscal dependency on federal transfers creates vulnerability. States can be coerced through funding conditions.	Virginia/Kentucky Resolutions (1798); nullification crisis (1832–33)
Popular mobilization	Fragmented — episodic protests without sustained coordination; epistemic polarization prevents unified opposition narrative.	Fragmentation of the information ecosystem prevents the formation of a shared factual base from which to mobilize.	Anti-war movement (1965–73); Polish Solidarity (1980–89)
Business pressure	Weakened — Chamber of Commerce institutionally unable to oppose policies harming its members.	Decades of partisan alignment eliminated the independent lever; cost of opposition exceeds perceived benefit.	Business Roundtable vs. Reagan deregulation (1981–84)
Electoral accountability	At risk — SAVE Act + mail-in voting restrictions threaten 40M+ voters; electoral administration under executive pressure.	If voting access mechanisms are altered before the 2026 cycle, electoral correction may become structurally impossible.	Jim Crow (1877–1965); Voting Rights Act (1965) as reversal

The resistance landscape is not nihilistic. American federalism is more robust than Hungary's or Turkey's at the time of their respective democratic backslides. Civil society, though under pressure, is significantly larger and more diverse. The federal judiciary, despite compositional changes, has demonstrated willingness to issue injunctions in numerous cases. But none of these factors is deterministic. The

history of democracies that survived similar pressures shows that survival was a function of the speed of institutional response, not merely of the availability of mechanisms.

XII. Prognosis: Long-Term Consequences

[PROJECTED] The experience expelled from federal service during the 'Fork in the Road' purge will not return. Even if subsequent administrations attempt to reconstitute the affected agencies, institutional knowledge is not replenished like a warehouse. The long-term result is a permanently diminished state capacity.

[ONGOING] Hospital closures, once they occur, do not reverse. Communities that lose their only regional hospital enter a permanent state of medical vulnerability that subsequent policy corrections cannot easily address.

[SCENARIO] Changes in voting access, if they survive judicial challenge and are implemented at scale, will reshape the electorate in ways that may be self-reinforcing — creating a smaller and demographically narrower voting population whose political preferences align with the architecture that restricted access in the first place.

The most difficult consequence to quantify — and potentially the most important — is the rupture of the implicit social compact that underlies American civic life. The expectation that the government will not raid your hospital, that your citizenship will protect you from indefinite detention, that your vote will be counted, that information you receive from official sources will bear some relationship to observable reality: these expectations are the fabric that connects residents to their government. Their systematic violation produces a population of residents variously positioned who no longer share a common framework for civic life.

Conclusion: What the Framework Demands

Applying the war framework to domestic policy analysis is not an act of rhetorical escalation. It is an act of analytical precision. When standard explanatory frameworks — political disagreement, electoral calculation, ideological conviction — fail to account for the simultaneity and systematic nature of the disruptions described in this document, the war framework is not being imported; it is being discovered.

What the framework demands of the analyst is a different set of questions. Not 'what policy outcome is this designed to achieve?' but 'what population is this designed to subordinate, and what resistance is it designed to prevent?' Not 'who benefits electorally?' but 'what institutional capacity, once destroyed, cannot be rebuilt?'

Not 'is this legal?' but 'what comes next?'

Those questions are uncomfortable. They are also necessary. Populations that have survived campaigns of domestic belligerence have consistently noted, in retrospect, that the damage was visible early and that resistance mechanisms were available.

The question was always whether the institutions and individuals responsible for using those mechanisms did so in time.

The answer, historically, depends less on the severity of the belligerence than on the clarity of those who name it.

Sources and Methodological Note

Primary sources: Federal Reserve Board; National Bureau of Economic Research; Congressional Budget Office; Senate Finance Committee hearing records; federal court rulings (Kollar-Kotelly et al.); Harvard Labor and Worklife Program (Block); documented hospital closure reports (Texas, Maine); state-level Medicaid impact analyses.

Comparative framework: Levitsky & Ziblatt 'How Democracies Die' (2018); Applebaum 'Twilight of Democracy' (2020); Mounk 'The People vs. Democracy' (2018); Freedom House Democracy Reports 2018–2025; CSIS Taiwan Strait Scenario Analysis (2024).

Note on falsifiability: This document specifies in Section 0 the conditions under which the adopted analytical framework would be invalidated. These conditions have not been met at the time of writing. The analysis remains provisional and subject to revision in light of contrary evidence.

Note on causal attribution: Where effects are attributed to specific policies, the document acknowledges the possibility of confounding variables and specifies the data needed to establish causality with greater rigor. Absent denominators in detention statistics reflect lack of access to executive data, not analytical negligence.

PART TWO

GLOBAL RISK SCENARIOS 2025–2030

Probability Analysis, Multidimensional Severity, Alert Indicators and Interdependencies · v2

Second Trump Administration · Updated with critical improvement analysis

Multidimensional Severity Classification System

Each scenario is evaluated on three independent dimensions (Human, Economic, Institutional) plus speed of onset. The 'Severity' column reflects the worst individual vector.

Severity	Scale	Human (H)	Economic (E)	Institutional (I)	Note
C — Catastrophic	Civilizational	Millions of deaths	>20% global GDP fall	Structural collapse	Irreversible for generations
V — Severe	Generational	Hundreds of thousands	10–20% GDP fall	Severe degradation	Reversible in decades
S — Serious	Decade	Tens of thousands	5–10% GDP fall	Functional deterioration	Reversible with sustained effort
G — Significant	Multi-year	Thousands / diffuse impact	1–5% GDP fall	Considerable pressure	Manageable with adequate policy

Scenario Table

Interdependencies marked with → indicate risks that increase significantly in probability or severity if the scenario in question materializes.

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
Dollar erosion as	45% (35–	**CATASTR**	Foreign central	USD share	Partially —

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
global reserve currency *Economy / Fiscal / Global*	60%)	**OPHIC H: C · E: C · I: V**	banks accelerate diversification; Treasuries lose safe-haven premium; import prices surge; Fed trapped between inflation and recession.	of global reserves falls below 55%; accelerated yuan-bond issuance by Gulf states; Japan/China reduce holdings >10% in one quarter.	requires fiscal discipline and multilateralism
Sovereign debt confidence crisis *Economy / Fiscal USA / Global*	35% (25–55%)	**CATASTROPHIC H: V · E: C · I: C**	Interest expenditure exceeds defense budget; BBBA adds $3–5 trillion; bond market strike triggers automatic cuts and capital flight.	10-year yield exceeds 6% sustained; Treasury auction below 2.0 coverage ratio; Moody's/Fitch downgrade.	No — requires major legislative change
China–Taiwan armed conflict *Geopolitics / Military / Asia-Pacific*	25% (15–40%)	**CATASTROPHIC H: C · E: C · I: C**	Blockade or invasion halts 92% of global advanced semiconductor production (TSMC); global manufacturing shock within 90 days.	TSMC export restrictions; Chinese naval exercises >4/year in Strait; changes in diplomatic recognition by US allies; consulate staff withdrawal.	Not directly — deterrence and strategic clarity are the only levers
Effective dissolution of NATO *Geopolitics / Security / Europe*	20% (10–35%)	**CATASTROPHIC H: C · E: V · I: C**	Article 5 non-compliance in the Baltics ends collective deterrence; post-war security architecture collapses; European rearmament race.	Russian incursion into Baltic gray zone without US response; US troop withdrawal in Europe <50,000; executive declarations conditioning Art. 5 on defense	Partially — depends on executive commitment signals

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
				spending.	
Deglobalization trade shock *Economy / Trade / Global*	30% (20–50%)	**SEVERE H: V · E: C · I: V**	Sustained 25–145% tariffs trigger retaliation cascades; international trade contracts sharply; Smoot-Hawley analog turns deceleration into depression.	EU/China retaliation with >30% tariffs on tech goods; global trade contraction >15% in two consecutive quarters; semiconductor supply chain rupture.	No within current tariff framework — reversal requires multilateral negotiation
Food shock in multiple regions *Climate / Agriculture / Global*	30% (20–45%)	**SEVERE H: C · E: V · I: V**	Simultaneous crop failures in US Midwest, Ganges Plain and sub-Saharan Africa; food insecurity in 60+ countries; political collapse in fragile states.	Global temperature index >1.8°C above pre-industrial sustained; simultaneous drought in Midwest + India + Sahel; wheat futures >$500/ton.	No in short term — strategic reserves and international coordination are the only levers
Irreversible democratic backsliding in USA *Governance / Institutions / USA*	35% (25–55%)	**SEVERE H: V · E: V · I: C**	Voting restrictions, judicial capture, agency politicization and media manipulation reach the threshold beyond which electoral correction becomes structurally impossible.	SAVE Act implemented without judicial block; >15M voters effectively deregistered; 2026 electoral result unchallenged despite documented irregularities.	Partially — judicial and civic mobilization are the available levers
Escalation to regional war in Middle East *Geopolitics / Military / Middle East*	30% (20–50%)	**SEVERE H: C · E: C · I: V**	Iran conflict spreads to Gulf; oil shock; oil above $150/barrel triggers global stagflation; US military overextension.	Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia or UAE infrastructure; closure of Strait of	Not directly — diplomacy and deterrence are the only levers

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
				Hormuz >72h; additional carrier deployment to Persian Gulf.	
Partial collapse of US healthcare system *Domestic / Health / USA*	60% (50–75%)	**SERIOUS H: C · E: V · I: V**	Loss of 10–15M Medicaid beneficiaries (CBO 2025), Medicare insolvency and ACA premium doubling converge; cascading rural hospital closures already documented in Texas and Maine; preventable mortality spikes.	Closure of >50 rural hospitals/year; infant mortality in rural counties rises >15% above 2024 baseline; >2M Medicaid deregistrations in first post-BBBA quarter.	No within current legislation — reversal requires legislative supermajority
Collapse of federal institutional capacity *Governance / Institutions / USA*	55% (45–70%)	**SERIOUS H: V · E: V · I: C**	Purge of 123,000 officials (Sept. 2025) destroys regulatory expertise; nuclear safety, public health and veterans services permanently degraded; 25,747 emergency rehire cases documented.	Nuclear inspection failures due to insufficient staff; epidemic outbreak without functional CDC response; >6-month delays in veteran benefits in >20 states.	No in short term — institutional knowledge is not rapidly recoverable
Stagflation (inflation + recession) *Economy / Domestic USA / Global*	45% (35–60%)	**SERIOUS H: V · E: C · I: V**	Tariff inflation (+0.7pp Fed 2025 estimate) coincides with recession from trade shock; Fed unable to cut rates without accelerating inflation; political and social pressure intensifies.	CPI >5% sustained 6 months + unemployment >5%; two consecutive quarters of negative GDP; Fed maintains rates >5% against persistent	Partially — tariff reversal would reduce inflationary pressure

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
				inflation.	
Labor displacement by AI without safety net *Technology / Economy / USA*	50% (40–65%)	**SERIOUS H: V · E: V · I: V**	White-collar job displacement compounds manual job losses; federal retraining programs dismantled; social unrest in communities already stressed by deindustrialization.	Structural unemployment >7% in services sectors; LLM adoption in >40% of legal/accountable tasks per benchmarks; >30% reduction in Labor Dept retraining programs.	Partially — social safety net and AI regulation are the available levers
Pandemic with degraded public health response *Public Health / Global / USA*	25% (15–40%)	**SERIOUS H: C · E: C · I: C**	New pathogen emerges; CDC and NIH decimated; international coordination severed by WHO withdrawal; response failure equal to or worse than 2020.	New zoonotic pathogen with R0>3; CDC response capacity reduced >40% vs 2024; absence of active multilateral early response protocol.	Not the pathogen — but response capacity, currently being degraded
Cyberattack on critical infrastructure *Security / Technology / USA*	35% (25–50%)	**SERIOUS H: V · E: C · I: V**	Russia, China or Iran exploit reduced federal cybersecurity staffing (CISA cut); attack on power grid, financial system or water supply succeeds at large scale.	CISA staff reduction >25%; successful test incident on minor infrastructure with no response; deterioration of intelligence relations with Five Eyes allies.	Partially — investment in cybersecurity and international cooperation are the levers
Sustained civil unrest and political violence *Domestic / Social / USA*	30% (20–45%)	**SERIOUS H: V · E: V · I: C**	Economic grievance, disenfranchisement and epistemic fragmentation combine; isolated	>3 documented political violence incidents/m	Partially — reducing economic grievance and

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
			political violence escalates to sustained civil instability. Historical analogs: 1968, late Weimar.	onth for 6 months; mobilizations of >100,000 people in multiple cities; state of emergency declared in >3 states.	electoral reform are the available levers
Cascade of emerging market debt crises *Economy / Emerging Markets / Global*	35% (25–50%)	**SIGNIFICANT H: V · E: C · I: V**	Strong dollar + high rates + trade disruption trigger crises in emerging economies; contagion to European banks; analog to 1997 Asian crisis but at larger scale.	EM debt spreads >600 basis points; 3+ countries simultaneously requesting IMF assistance; EM currency depreciation >20% vs dollar in one semester.	Not directly from USA — IMF/G20 coordination is the only lever
Social Security and Medicare trust fund insolvency *Domestic / Fiscal / USA*	40% (30–55%)	**SIGNIFICANT H: C · E: C · I: V**	Trust fund insolvency triggers automatic 20–25% benefit cuts; 60+ million beneficiaries affected; consumer spending collapses.	Actuarial insolvency projection <8 years published by trustees; reform legislation fails in two consecutive legislative cycles; trust funds below 20% reserve.	Yes — legislative reform is viable but politically blocked
Entrenched epistemic crisis *Governance / Society / USA*	65% (55–80%)	**SIGNIFICANT H: V · E: V · I: C**	Independent media hollowed out; population loses shared factual basis for political decision-making; opposition, judicial oversight and electoral accountability degrade together. Meta-risk: amplifies all others.	>5 major national media outlets under direct/indirect control aligned with executive; polls show >60% of citizens	Partially — media transparency legislation and civic education are long-term levers

Scenario / Area	Prob.	Severity	Description	Alert Indicators	Controllable?
				unable to identify verified information sources; >30% decline in institutional trust.	

Methodological Note

Probabilities

Central estimates are analytical judgments based on academic literature, institutional data and geopolitical analysis. Ranges (minimum–maximum) reflect second-order uncertainty. They should not be interpreted as precise statistical probabilities.

Multidimensional Severity

H/E/I values are relative qualitative assessments. C = civilizational-scale impact; V = generational; S = decade; G = multi-year.

Interdependencies

Scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The two with highest probability — epistemic crisis (65%) and healthcare system collapse (60%) — are also those that most impede response to all the others. The materialization of any catastrophic scenario raises the probabilities of the others by 10–20 percentage points.

Primary sources: CBO (2025), Federal Reserve, NBER, CSIS Taiwan Strait Analysis (2024), Levitsky & Ziblatt 'How Democracies Die,' Harvard Labor and Worklife Program, federal court records.